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This article examines the relationship between ethnicity,
democracy and development in Papua New Guinea. Drawing on
an earlier co-authored study, it shows that a key cause of
disparities in provincial development in Papua New Guinea is
variation in the levels of ethnic diversity between provinces. Even
when alternative explanations such as size, government
performance and resource endowments are factored in, more
diverse provinces have significantly lower development levels
than more homogeneous ones. Increasing levels of ethnic
diversity are associated with lower overall levels of development,
in part because ethnic divisions encourage rent-seeking behaviour,
leading to sub-optimal outcomes for the country as a whole.
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Around the world, a range of comparative
studies by economists and political scientists
in recent years have found a consistent
negative relationship between ethno-
linguistic fragmentation and development.
In one case, a World Bank study of economic
growth in Africa found ethnic diversity to be
negatively correlated with economic growth,
schooling attainment, availability of
infrastructure and sound government
policies, prompting the authors to identify
ethnic fragmentation as the key to Africa’s
‘growth tragedy’ (Easterly and Levine 1997).
Another study looking at all regions of
the world found ethnic fragmentation to be
independently associated with a range of
negative outcomes, including lower
economic growth and higher levels of income
inequality (Rodrik 1999). Looking at social
indicators as well as economic ones,
Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998) reported a
similar relationship. Likewise, Mauro (1995)
concluded that fragmented societies had a
strong tendency towards corruption,
because of the tendency of members of ethnic
groups to favour their own kin.
Other studies which use purely
linguistic fragmentation as their dependent
variable have reported similar results. In one
of the earliest studies of the impact of
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linguistic fragmentation, Fishman (1968)
found that linguistically more heterogeneous
countries had, on average, higher rates of
mortality, lower gross national product,
lower government revenues, fewer students
in high education, lower literacy, and fewer
radios, televisions and newspapers than
more homogenous countries. More recent
analyses have confirmed these results and
found similar trends in other indicators of
development (Nettle 2000). For example, in a
comparative study looking specifically at
language fragmentation, Easterly (2001)
found that more linguistically diverse societies
had half the schooling years, one-thirteenth
the telephones per worker, twice as many
electric power losses, and less than half as
many paved roads as more homogenous ones.
Why is ethno-linguistic diversity
associated with so many poor outcomes?
While a number of competing theories have
been put forward, most explanations boil
down to the deleterious effects of fragment-
ation on economic growth. Linguistic
explanations focus on the coordination
problems created by many different
languages, thereby limiting trade, handi-
capping efficient markets and undermining
prospects for cooperation in general. Ethnic
explanations add to these problems the
specific effects of economic and political
competition between groups for power and
resources. There are several reasons for this.
First, in more heterogeneous states, sound
macroeconomic policy is made subservient
to the rent-seeking ambitions of ethnic
cliques, who focus their energies on wealth
redistribution rather than wealth creation.
Second, growth-promoting public infra-
structure like health and education will be
under-supplied in more heterogeneous states
because of the difficulties of reaching
agreement on the provision of such public
goods across ethnic lines. Finally, both ethnic
and linguistic fragmentation is negatively
related to the development of ‘social capital’,
the network of civic bonds and associations
that are increasingly posited as underpinning
good economic and political performance (see
Putnam 1993, 2000).
Ethnic diversity and provincial
development in Papua New Guinea
Because of its exceptionally high level of
social diversity, Papua New Guinea
functions as a key test case for examining
the relationship between ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity and developmental outcomes.
On the measure of language diversity, for
example, Papua New Guinea is probably the
most hetrogeneous country in the world, with
852 separate languages (about one quarter of
the world total) in existence (see May 2003).
This linguistic diversity translates into
exceptional cultural fragmentation. Deklin
writes that ‘Papua New Guinea is a land of
many cultures and, if we take the number of
languages in the country as a rough criterion,
there are some 1,000 cultures’ (Deklin
1992:35). As in most of Melanesia, Papua New
Guinea’s basic cultural unit comprises
ascriptive extended family networks or ‘clans’
which are the primary unit of political and
social loyalty (see Hogbin 1973). Combined
with the effects of the country’s dramatic
terrain—with a vast range of mountains and
valleys running though the middle of the
mainland (‘the Highlands’), and an extensive
arc of populated volcanic islands off the
coast—this has created a multiplicity of micro-
ethnic identities. However, the level of societal
heterogeneity within Papua New Guinea
varies widely, with some regions being
relatively homogenous and others, especially
in the Highlands areas, being exceptionally
fragmented.
In a recent study of this phenomenon in
Papua New Guinea, Reilly and Phillpot
(2002) examined the relationship between
ethnic fragmentation and provincial
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development.1 The main challenge was to
find a meaningful way to measure ‘ethnicity’.
Papua New Guinea’s exceptional level
of clan, linguistic and regional diversity
creates real challenges in attempting to
come up with any aggregate measure of
ethnic heterogeneity. In addition, ethnicity
itself is a notoriously slippery concept, and
ethnic identity in Papua New Guinea—as
elsewhere—is a combination of both
‘primordial’ and ‘instrumental’ factors. In
other words, it is both an ascriptive
phenomenon, based on traditional ties of
clan, tribe, and language—a position often
characterised in the scholarly literature as
‘primordialism’2—as well as an adaptive
one of more malleable or constructed identities
formed as a reaction to external pressures
and incentives—or ‘instrumentalism’.3
Many analyses of ethnicity in Papua New
Guinea therefore emphasise the extent to
which ethnic identities are both a salient
feature of traditional society and also a
reaction to the more recent experience of
colonial rule, modernisation and
independence (see Premdas 1989:246).
One indicator of the primordial
component of ethnicity is the extent of
linguistic diversity in each province. However,
this only applies to non-Highlands provinces.
In the Highlands, the major language groups
are themselves fragmented along clan and
tribal lines, and thus do not provide a
meaningful measure of diversity. Outside the
Highlands, however, the number of separate
language groups provides a rough approx-
imation of the number of self-conscious
‘ethnic’ groups in many cases. Looking at
these non-Highlands provinces, where
linguistic divisions have often been
prominent, we found that the more languages
there were in a province, the lower the overall
level of provincial development: regression
analysis suggested that almost 70 per cent
in the variation in provincial development
levels could be explained by variations in
the number of languages. The most plausible
interpretation of this result is that language
multiplicity somehow impedes development,
rather than development affecting linguistic
structure. This suggests, on the face of it, a
negative relationship between ethno-
linguistic fragmentation and provincial
development.
However, Highlands provinces also
needed to be included in the equation. One
way of doing this was to look at the number
of candidates standing for election in
Highlands seats, as in many areas clans will
nominate and then block vote for a particular
candidate to represent their interests against
other rival groups. In such cases, candidates
concentrate on mobilising the vote of their
own clan group, and clans spend much time
and energy on deciding which candidate
they will put forward for election (see
Standish 1994:60). As a result, the electoral
contest provides a substitute arena in which
traditional clan rivalries and tribal conflicts
can be fought out (Strathern 1993). Many
analyses of elections in Papua New Guinea
have emphasised the enduring link between
tribal affiliation and election candidature
(see, for example, Saffu 1996). Indeed, one of
the strongest reasons for using candidate
numbers as an indicator of ethnic pluralism
is that it helps capture the fluid, politically
constructed nature of ethnic identity as well
as its more primordial, ascriptive aspects.
To test the validity of this approach, we
compared data on clan affiliation from the
five open electorates in Enga, collected by the
Papua New Guinea Electoral Commission,
with the total number of candidates standing
in each seat there at recent elections. Enga is
the only province for which such clan data
is available, and because of the small sample
of five electorates it can only give us a partial
indication as to whether any relationship
between clan and candidate numbers exist.
That said, there was an extremely strong
positive correlation between the number of
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clans and the number of candidates standing
for election in each seat of r = 0.881, p < 0.05,
using 1997 electoral data. If Enga is indicative
of the other four Highlands provinces, then
the number of candidates standing for
election in each province may also serve as a
rough indicator of the number of politicised
clan or tribal groups.
Applying this technique to the Highlands
as a whole via a comparison between
provincial development and the number of
candidates standing at the 1997 election, we
again found a strong negative correlation
between ethnic diversity and provincial
development. Analysis of the 1992 national
results was similar, suggesting that—across
all provinces—lower levels of provincial
development are associated with more
candidates standing for election.
Finally, we combined the language and
candidate indicators into one index in order
to create a crude but useful measure of the
relative extent of ethnic fragmentation across
the whole country (see Figure 1). Correlation
analysis between provincial development
and this combined measure of ‘ethnicity’
produced a strong and statistically significant
correlation between these variables of
r = -0.748, p<0.01 across all provinces (Reilly
and Philpott 2002).
This suggests a strong negative impact of
diversity on development. But perhaps the
correlation between the two is spurious, and
both are being driven by another underlying
factor, such as resource endowment,
population pressure, or land area. To test
whether this is the case, we used a multiple
regression model to evaluate the extent to
which other ‘environmental’ factors besides
‘ethnicity’—such as population, area and land
pressure—impact on provincial development.
Three specific indicators were examined:
provincial population, the area of each
province in square kilometres, and an index of
rural disadvantage which measures arable
land potential, agricultural pressure, access to
services, income from agriculture and child
malnutrition in each district, aggregated to the
Linear Regression
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Figure 1 Provincial development and ‘ethnicity’
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provincial level.4 These variables have the
advantage of measuring basic restraints on
development that were not included in the
provincial development indicator.
The overall results indicate once again
that the degree of ethnic diversity in a
province is a better predictor of the level of
provincial development than any of these
other causal variables (Table 1). Overall, 85
per cent of the variation in provincial
development was explained by this model,
with population, the rural disadvantage
index, and the ‘ethnicity’ variable each
having a statistically significant impact. But
of these, ‘ethnicity’ had the largest Beta score
of -0.496. According to the model, a 10 per
cent decline in the level of ethnic fragment-
ation in a province should, other things being
equal, result in almost a 5 per cent rise in
provincial development.
The robustness of the ethnicity variable
in explaining differences in provincial
development represents a challenge to many
existing explanations of government perform-
ance in Papua New Guinea, which tend to
concentrate on factors like resource endow-
ment, geography and history (particularly in
regards to the smaller island provinces,
which have also had a much longer history
of interaction with the outside world than
the more recently contacted Highlands) to
explain differentials in provincial
performance. As Table 1 shows, variance in
‘ethnicity’ is a more significant and robust
explanator of development levels than any
of these more conventional explanations: the
more ethnically fragmented a province, the
more likely it is to be underdeveloped, and
each one-unit drop in the level of ethnic
heterogeneity sees a rise of almost half a unit
in the provincial development rankings.
Explaining the result
The starting point in explaining this result
is to understand how ethnicity in societies
like Papua New Guinea is used to mobilise
population groups. Take, for example, the
way ethnicity affects the electoral process. In
Papua New Guinea, as in many other
developing countries, electoral politics is
primarily a competition for access to the state.
In the Highlands province of Simbu, for
example
…people have come to regard govern-
ment as the major, or only, source of
opportunity and finance. Having a
Table 1 Regression analysis: impacts on provincial development
Standardised coefficients
Beta t Sig.
Population –0.421 –3.454 0.004**
Land area –0.033 –0.250 0.806
Ethnicity –0.496 –3.871 0.002**
Rural 0.399 3.064 0.008**
** p<0.01
Source: Reilly, B. and Phillpot, R., 2002. ‘”Making democracy work” in Papua New Guinea: social capital
and provincial development in an ethnically fragmented society’, Asian Survey, XLII(6):922.
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friend in national government is seen
as necessary for economic success, and
election to office in the provincial
assembly and parliament is keenly
contested (Brown 1989:245).
As a result, ‘popular participation in politics
has strengthened the connection between
politics and material benefits’ (Woolner
1995:7). Aspiring candidates make (often
optimistic) calculations of their electoral
prospects based on the number of voters in
their own clan and tribal groups. Once
elected, the expectation is that successful
candidates will use their position to extract
resources from the government and deliver
them back to their own clan, but not
necessarily to the electorate as a whole.
Reviewing the situation in the early 1990s,
Strathern found that
…it was understood that politicians are
in power to benefit themselves and their
factions, and they concentrate on
consolidating their existing power
bases. As a result of armed conflict
between groups these bases had become
more, rather than less, rigidly defined
and a process of neotribalisation was
well underway (Strathern 1993:48).
Both traditional social relations and
modern political entrepreneurship in Papua
New Guinea involve the mobilisation and
manipulation of such ethnic identities—a
process which, as Claxton notes, is
itself conflict-creating in the absence of
structures able to regulate competition for
power, wealth and status (Claxton 2000:267).
For example in the Highlands, where almost
half the Papua New Guinea population
lives, modernisation, land pressure and
competition for resources has encouraged a
‘retribalisation’ of society in recent years as
group affiliation is increasingly used to
determine the distribution of public goods.
As such, tribal groups are increasingly being
mobilised, refashioned, or at times invented
from scratch, in response to the demands of
state building (see Ferguson and Whitehead
1992). Filer, for example, found that land-
holding disputes in areas as varied as
Central Province and the Lihir Islands have
seen some claimants invent clan identities
in order to facilitate collective demands for
compensation (Filer 2000).
In contemporary Papua New Guinea,
clans thus increasingly play the role of
interest groups. By seeking to maximise
outcomes for their own members, they
inevitably and inexorably create a collective
action dilemma for the country as a whole.
The combined effect of many small ethnic
groups acting to secure their own interests
undermines the broader interests of society.
Because time horizons are short, possible
productive investments are curtailed. Energies
are focused on short-term wealth distribution
rather than long-term wealth creation. Rent-
seeking—‘the socially costly pursuit of wealth
transfers’ (Tollison 1997:506)—flourishes, as
each tribal group attempts to monopolise any
potential public good for their own ends. The
result is that public goods are increasingly
diverted towards the private enrichment of
political entrepreneurs and the small ethnic
interest groups they represent. Beneficial
outcomes for society at large are overwhelmed
by a collective action problem created by
several thousand small ethnic collectives
competing with each other for resources,
prestige and public goods.5
In such a situation, each clan’s candidate
represents a potential financial and status
windfall for the clan as a whole if he (or, very
rarely, she) is elected. Each clan therefore has
a strong ‘selective incentive’, in the words of
collective action theory, to enforce the voting
contract within its own ranks and make sure
that their candidate gains as many votes as
possible. But to do this, they have to overcome
the collective action problem endemic to
group politics (Olson 1971). Group leaders
thus monitor and police their own block
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voting choice, and ruthlessly sanction any
deviations from this. From Simbu, Standish
reported that
…in many polling booths officials were
coerced with weapons (axes, knives and
pistols) to give out ballot papers in bulk
and accept people blatantly voting ten
or twenty times...One intending voter
was chased from a booth and stoned to
death, and five were killed in post-
election disturbances, including at least
four for voting ‘the wrong way’, that is
against the desire of their communities
(Standish 1994:70–71).
While a cause of great concern, this type
of ‘gunpoint democracy’ is not, however, a
dominant pattern across Papua New Guinea
as a whole—at least, not yet (see Saffu 1996:41).
Indeed, there are clear regional and structural
trends to election violence in Papua New
Guinea: it is precisely those Highlands
regions such as Enga, Simbu and the Western
and Eastern Highlands provinces where
ethnic fragmentation is most pronounced, and
indicators of provincial social capital least
developed, that electoral violence also appears
to be a factor.6 Ominously, however, urban
areas such as Papua New Guinea’s main city,
Port Moresby, are increasingly replicating
these forms of negative social capital in an
urban environment, via raskol criminal gangs
and other collectivities formed along ethnic
and cultural lines.
However, ethnic violence remains
predominantly a local-level phenomenon. At
the national level, Papua New Guinea’s
multiplicity of ethno-linguistic groups means
that some degree of inter-ethnic cooperation
and accommodation is usually unavoidable.
One reason that Papua New Guinea has been
able to maintain a system of continuous
democracy at the national level is that no
group has anything like the size or potential
to act as a hegemon and dominate others, or
to overthrow the incumbent regime. The result
is that national politics is, by necessity,
characterised by the products of this
societal diversity—shifting alliances, cross-
ethnic bargains and diverse multi-ethnic
coalitions—all of which have facilitated the
continuity of formal democracy at the national
level (see Reilly 2000). But because political
leaders must service the needs of their tribal
constituency rather than their electorate or the
nation as a whole, the collective action
dilemma affects government policy as well.
Papua New Guinea’s national motto is
‘unity in diversity’, and there is no doubt that
it has achieved some remarkable successes
in uniting thousands of small stateless
societies into one fractious but ongoing state
structure. But at the same time, in the words
of former Prime Minister Paias Wingti, ‘this
diversity is slowly strangling our nationhood’
(in Connell 1997:299). Ethnic fragmentation,
while ensuring the continuity of formal
democracy at the national level, has under-
mined the development of social capital at
the local level and effectively created a
massive collective action problem. As a
consequence, politics is characterised by
intense zero-sum competition for a small and
dwindling reward base, and life in some
parts of Papua New Guinea has reverted to
a Hobbesian struggle for meagre resources.
Desperate though such a situation is, it
is irrational for any one individual to attempt
to forge a cooperative alternative under
prevailing forms of clan-based social
organisation. Instead, the bleak logic of the
collective action dilemma unwinds, as groups
seeking to promote their own interests try to
monopolise access to public goods and
opportunities for rent-seeking by their group
alone (Olson 1971). The fragmentation of
Papua New Guinea society exacerbates this
problem by creating a situation of many
small clans operating effectively as interest
groups, attempting to exploit any available
public good for their membership. The result
is grossly sub-optimal outcomes for the
country as a whole.
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Notes
1 The following sections draw liberally on this
earlier co-authored article.
2 The term ‘primordialism’ is usually associated
with Geertz (1963). For a discussion of this
typology in the scholarly literature, see
Esman (1994).
3 There is a considerable literature on ethnicity
and ethnic identity. See Young (1976), Brass
(1985),  Smith (1986), Horowitz (1985) and
Esman (1994).
4 This final variable uses district data, aggregated
to the provincial level, from Hanson et al.
(2001).
5 As Claxton (2000:268) notes, the cohesion and
the utility of clan and tribal groups tends to
increase as they decrease in size.
6 See Standish (1996:277–322) and Dinnen
(1996:91–98).
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